Is sending arms to Ukraine a move of deep geostrategic wisdom?
Perhaps a policy that looks on the face of it a foolish adventure of the post-Cold War liberal hegemonic type could in fact be a wise strategic move.
If the EU could ever get its act together and form a unified military, it would pose an existential risk to Britain. Such an armed force is highly unlikely, given the political and national interests involved. However, if it did happen, and the UK was on the outside, British trade and even regulation would ultimately continue at the grace of the EU, and the UK would have to maintain friendly relations with the EU on EU terms.
It is therefore crucial (from a realpolitik perspective) that the UK does not allow this to happen. The traditional means for this has been to sow discord and act as a swing power to balance European powers against eachother.
In modern Europe, the clearest divide at present is between the Eastern European, largely conservative and nationalist counties within the Visegrad grouping, and the liberal hegemonic power seated in Brussels. The largest and most powerful of the Visegrad nation is Poland, and its geostrategic reality has through history been its location between the two 800 pound gorillas of Europe, Germany and Russia. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Poland had a vast and powerful empire, but since the eighteenth century, it has constantly found itself invaded, conquered or dominated by Russia and Germany. Russia, therefore, by its very existence (under whatever form of government), is a risk that Poland must always keep in mind.
The UK has no real interest in Ukraine. It matters not whether the country falls within the German sphere of influence, the Russian sphere or remains neutral. None of these outcomes would affect British security, trade or economic interests.
Given this absence of interest, sending arms to a country that has no prospect of defending itself against Russia at a time when we seem barely able to staff, equip and train our own Armed Forces adequately, would seem a strange choice. However, what we have done is sent a signal to Poland that we are a more reliable partner in a crisis than Germany and the rest of the EU.
If Poland was able to rely on the UK more than the EU, then it would be able to take a firmer line in its disputes with Brussels, which, in fact, strike at the heart of Brussels control (the Treaty of Rome was directly attacked by the recent Polish court decision), which in turn makes EU unity far more difficult to achieve or impose.
Furthermore, one of the USA's strategic aims is to make sure that no regional hegemon can emerge in any strategically important area of the world. It is for this reason that the US has taken on Germany twice, Japan once, Russia once, and is now turning its sights toward China. The US is always wary of countries that are 'natural' regional hegemons, even when they are weak (see Iran and now Turkey), and therefore will always be cautious about Russia.
However the China threat means the US has neither the resources nor will to check any expansion of Russian influence. It has thus been screaming for at least a decade for Europeans to take a greater role. As the EU bows to German interests, the UK has just shown the most powerful nation in the world that it is more reliable in doing what the US wants.
This is the price we pay for relying on the US for our national security. However, if we are going to run our defence and foreign policy in this way, it is a sensible step to take. So perhaps a policy that looks on the face of it a foolish adventure of the post-Cold War liberal hegemonic type could in fact be a wise strategic move: keep your guarantor of security happy while helping a country that might weaken the EU's ability to act in a unified manner.
