Locking down supply? COVID-19, hospital space, and remedial reform
“The outcome of these policies will serve as the two millstones necessary to grind the middle and working-classes, with the increase in taxes on the one hand and the inevitable growth of inflation on the other.”
As England enters a second lockdown period, people are not just divided bilaterally - "is locking down the right thing to do?” - but multilaterally; questions regarding timescale, intensity, and regionalisation, enter the equation. Remembering the Aristotelian precept that man is a “political animal”, such is inevitable. Despite the fact that statisticians are keen to lend weight to many sides, the salient fact of the matter is that the picture is not being assessed in its entirety. Perversions and confusion reign. Yet if there is one thing in abundant clarity, it is the concern that the National Health Service (hereafter, NHS) - the popular socialised medical care provider across Britain - will not be able to cope with another spike in demand for its services; we are told that we must “Protect the NHS”. But our ability to aid this process rests upon a number of variables, which aren’t so narrow as it would seem.
The concerns presented before us, namely the justification for a second lockdown, are essentially ones reducible to a fundamental displacement of the mechanisms governing an ordinary market structure; inductive reasoning leads that, if the NHS “cannot cope” with a second wave, there is a circulatory issue with regards to a supply of capital in approximation to demand. Given that it is an institution essentially operated by the State and that alone, a restricted supply of services, both for consumer and producer, is inevitable. The reasoning behind this involves a multitude of aspects, but it is fundamentally that the inelasticity of the good, healthcare, places it in almost constant demand, and therefore short-circuits a normative equilibrium calibration by subjecting that overwhelming demand to the budgetary limitations, and therefore the supply chain, of the State. The same would occur should the government enact a policy of eminent domain, and thereafter exclusively hold rights to land across the country.
Now that this is becoming evident under the pressure of a public both victims of a completely unexpected virus and whipped into a frenzy by the preaching of “advisors”, the usual recourse is given: tax hikes, Quantitative Easing programmes, artificial credit stimulation, and increased borrowing from foreign powers.
Predictably, the outcome of these policies will serve as the two millstones necessary to grind the middle and working-classes, particularly with the increase in taxes on the one hand and the inevitable growth of inflation on the other.
If wallets aren’t being emptied directly, they will be indirectly; a government monopolising an unbacked and essentially meaningless currency will find a way to attempt reclamation. Furthermore, the artificial stimulation of the credit sector, as well as the swallowing up of securities in the market, will serve to displace any sense of genuine regrowth in the economy, as they are false indicators of economic health in the first place.
The latter instances, compared to the host of tools open to the government when it comes to damage reduction, pales in comparison. Instead, a programme spurring genuine recovery may take shape as follows: first, immediate tax reductions across the board, including on income, labour, and exchange; second, a further issuance of tax credits for those in the sectors concerned, including charitable care and support; third, decentralisation of administration and the liquidation of bureaucratic offices, enabling the rediversion of capital to the sectors requiring it; fourth, the issue of bond-holder certificates to those working in State-run hospitals, and; fifth, the further issue of high-yield “junk” bonds to those otherwise-interested private persons.
Albeit posited as basic as possible, the fundamental tenets of such a programme would aim towards the incentivisation and circulation of supply, both labour and capital, intended to meet a surging demand, encompassing both the State and private institutions, perhaps providing some relief also to the suffocated private and charitable service providers; finally, it would alleviate some of the concerns aforementioned and produce an alternative economic programme which places long-term prosperity and security over immediate panic. It is fair to say that the latter has but failed.
If we cannot at least look past the typical prescription, it will be a case of lockdown after lockdown, now inventively repackaged as a “circuit-breaker”. Not only does it command a quantitative response, but a qualitative code, too; the reforms aforementioned seek just that, giving a platform to the economic justice necessary to secure for families a future outside of the millstones that, typically, resolve in their dissolution. Building blocks such as these are fundamental to the extensions of a productive workshop, and therefore, in domino sequence, to civilisation itself. If nothing else, the Conservatives, if they wish not to annihilate their voter base, will have to look toward something different.
A longer and more detailed version of this essay is available over on Samuel George’s Medium page, @PheasantsRevolt.
