The Thucydides Trap: Are the US and China headed for war?

US foreign policy is creating an environment in which the US is less likely to maintain its global dominance. Worse, it is also increasing the probability of a third world war erupting.

In recent years, East Asia (sometimes referred to as the Western Pacific) has become an increasing concern for US foreign policy makers because the balance of power in the region increasingly favours Chinese dominion, but the facts on the ground – trade and diplomatic terms – have not caught up. Instead, they reflect an earlier period when the USA was enjoying its unipolar moment and, more importantly, China was still weak.

Thus, there is now a mismatch between power and arrangements.

The US would dearly like to maintain the status quo, first, because East Asia will be the centre of economic gravity in the 21st century, and secondly, because it is a tenet of US foreign policy to ensure that no power can gain the sort of regional hegemony that the US enjoys - especially in an area of strategic interest.

China, on the other hand, would understandably like trade, defence and diplomatic arrangements to more closely reflect its increased power in the region. Why shouldn't it have a say to match its newfound (and growing) stature?

Given this is a matter of cardinal geostrategic importance for both sides, they are heading for conflict – the oft referenced Thucydides Trap in which a rising power seeks to reset arrangements in its area of influence to better match its newfound power. We can see the opening salvos of this conflict in the Biden Administration's chip ban, which is a naked attempt to hobble China's economic growth in key emerging industries.

Nevertheless, Washington’s efforts on this course are ultimately going to have to be backed by a credible military force, because if it refuses to allow for a natural rebalancing of power in the region – which it won't, because why would it strengthen a rival? – the likelihood that China seeks to solve the political impasse by military means increases.

The problem for the US is that it must raise spending and tighten focus on the Pacific Theatre even as it is becoming increasingly embroiled in an escalatory trial of strength on Europe's Eastern Approaches.

In fact, contrary to the oft repeated soundbite that US actions in Ukraine will deter China from pursuing similar action in Taiwan, they increase the chances China will be tempted to act now to reset the table in its neighborhood, because by spending finite military hardware, money and political capital propping up Ukraine, the US reduces its ability to do likewise with Taiwan.

Any such attempt to take Taiwan would leave the world in at least a de facto (i.e. undeclared) Third World War, given Russia's closeness to China and the fact the ‘West’ would be fighting, again, at the two ends of the Eurasian landmass.

Equally, even if Russia is defeated or ground to a halt in Ukraine, any war in the Western Pacific would swing the balance of power in Europe back in Russia's favour, thus tempting Russia to have another (perhaps bigger) bite at the cherry. Thus, not only does present US policy of defending two fronts (plus, it seems, to a lesser degree, the Middle East) raise the chances that it will end up strong nowhere in a vain attempt to be strong everywhere, but also that it will find itself fighting a two front Third World War.

There are three solutions to this problem. First, Bismarckean sequencing: grinding Russia down, hobbling its economy, and perhaps even plunging it into internal conflict, before swinging toward China, tooling up for Air-Sea Battle and littoral infantry by, say, the early or mid-2030s.

This is likely Washington’s ideal solution, but it relies on China, Russia and perhaps Iran allowing this to happen. Furthermore, as aforementioned, the more Washington commits to such sequencing, the more tempting it becomes for China to act early while the US is at its most vulnerable.

An alternative would be for the US Federal Government to spend much more on the military to allow it to commit greater numbers to Europe while simultaneously accelerating procurement of the Naval, Air, Unmanned and Expeditionary assets it needs to counter China.
Even ignoring the wisdom of such a course of action, it is an open question whether it would even be available to the US, given the country already has high levels of debt, a seemingly chronic deficit, and stated (cross-party) policy desires to invest in infrastructure, green technology and industry, and re-shore capacity from China.

Further, such a policy would risk the US spending itself to defeat, much as the USSR did in its attempt to keep up with Reagan’s military expansion in the 1980s.

The final option is to have Europe defend Europe so that the US can concentrate on Asia. That makes the most sense, as Alex Velez-Green, the National Security Advisor to Josh Hawley, Republican Senator for Missouri, and Elbridge Colby, the former Assistant Deputy Secretary of Defence, have argued. In fact, this should be achievable: Europe has for decades freeloaded on the USA's soft imperialism, and is more than rich enough to shoulder its own defensive burden.

The problem is that the conflict in Ukraine is making it increasingly unattainable. For Europe to defend Europe, Europe would have to spend considerably more on defence over a significant period. Yet the European response to Russia’s actions in Ukraine have depleted European armouries and is in the process of savaging their economies.

Where will the money come from to not only refill the quartermasters' stores but also to replace the United States military when Europe faces recession and deindustrialisation because it can no longer get its energy from the most economically rational supplier? (At this stage, it should be noted that to ‘replace the US’ role defending Eastern Europe, European nations would, in addition to buying more stuff and hiring more soldiers, build from near scratch crucial capabilities for which they rely greatly on the US, such as command and control, ISR (including satellites) and SEAD).

It seems, therefore, that while this third option is the most sensible, it is predicated on quickly finding a solution to the Ukraine conflict. A swift end would allow the US to husband its materiel rather than sending it to Ukraine, and then phase a withdrawal from Eastern Europe over many years. Meanwhile the Europeans would be able to buy the gas from Russia that would save their economies in the short and medium term, providing the tax base to fund greater defence responsibilities.

Alas, the prospects of any such agreement seem dim. The people who run US foreign policy have in their rhetoric said that the battle in Ukraine is existential for US credibility (it wasn't until they made it so) and even liberal democracy itself (it clearly isn't). Anything but victory would therefore represent a humiliating climbdown.

Sadly, they are also the people who tend to blithely say that "we can walk and chew gum at the same time" and condescendingly dismiss talk of "overextension". Thus, the US is left to rely on luck to get its 'sequencing' right. In doing so, Washington is increasing the probability that it will lose the real prize, SE Asia, to keep a sideshow, Ukraine – and worse, be dragged into a Third World War.